Introduction
The personal papers of Professor Sir Richard Doll, CH, OBE, distinguished epidemiologist, are now catalogued and available for consultation at the Wellcome Library for the History and Understanding of Medicine.' Illustrating a life-long commitment to epidemiological research, they evince a strong sense of historical continuity and public responsibility, and demonstrate very well the social and ethical nexus in which epidemiology is rooted. Its focus on the balance of health benefits to be gained by a given community as a whole has, therefore, a utilitarian philosophical cast in its careful and disinterested weighing of risk and benefit. Ample evidence of epidemiology's statistical core-from computer-generated data to graphs and tables-is contained in the papers, as are the reasoning processes that lead to a balanced and supported set of conclusions. In addition to illustrating the epidemiologist at work, the papers allow us to hear something of the voices of those individuals and constituent groups of society who-through vested interest, uncertainty or vulnerability-have kept a close watch on many of the conclusions drawn, conclusions that may have seemed to some, from a professional, corporate or community point of vantage, to be more balanced in expression than they would have liked. Certainly there is no doubting on the evidence of the papers preserved-in the multiple drafts of papers, and in the close readings of the papers of others-that Doll was meticulous in his choice of words and their import. Taken as a whole, the Doll papers provide an insight into the practice of epidemiology in the second half of the twentieth century, a period in which the randomized trial-now much elaborated and often great in scale-has flourished.
As far as the practice of epidemiology in the period following the Second World War is concerned-when Doll began to work on clinical trials under Francis Avery Jones at Central Middlesex Hospital and under Austin Bradford Hill at the Statistical Research Unit of the Medical Research Council-he is in no doubt about the significance of Bradford Hill's contribution to the direction that epidemiology was to take. Doll's obituary for Sir Austin Bradford Hill notes the impact on the field of Bradford Hill's series of introductory papers on statistical principles, first published in the Lancet in 1937,2 in which he "laid the foundation for the burgeoning science of epidemiology and transformed the conduct of clinical trials by demonstrating the advantages of randomisation."3 In his subsequent paper on Bradford Hill's contribution to the progress of medical science, Doll identifies "the retrospective and prospective studies designed by Bradford Hill" as "the basic tools ofepidemiology throughout the world. What is wanted is a definitive population which can be observed to see what proportion die of cancer of the lung in a given period-a proportion which can be compared with expectation, based on general mortality figures. A possible way of doing this might be to define your population as being 'certified cases of asbestosis' and then to follow them to death. Best of all would be to limit the population to cases certified arising out of the periodic medical exam at specific factories, but I imagine that would reduce the numbers too much. I don't know whether you've had anything like that number certified at the Cape Company since 1931.
A meeting at Cape Asbestos was finally arranged for 24 March 1949. By 6 May 1949, Wyers had "prepared all the figures with the exception of the series of certification dates and to my surprise I find that the Company's records are exceedingly scrappy". Both Wyers and Doll endeavoured to obtain the missing information (from the South Wales Pneumoconiosis Panel), but evidently were unsuccessful. There is then an unexplained hiatus in the correspondence between the two, until 15 September 1955, when Myers wrote interestedly to Doll for reprints of the published paper and there the correspondence, as we have it, concludes."7
The first communication between Knox and Doll is a letter to Doll (12 April 1953) in which Knox introduces himself, indicates a familiarity with Doll's published papers to date and offers "some material of interest".'8 He goes on to admit that his "statistical ability is nil" but he has "approval ... to approach a medical statistical authority to discuss this question". Notwithstanding this opening statement, an approval to approach and an approval to publish were to prove to be two very different things in the eyes of the Turner Brothers Board. As the momentum to publication gathered pace, the Board became increasingly nervous about the paper's principal conclusion of a lung cancer risk of ten times that of the general population for those who had been exposed to asbestos for twenty years or more. The nervousness first manifested itself in the Board's refusal to allow Knox's name to be associated with the paper, despite his instigative role: "I gather that my name on the paper might not be acceptable as it would naturally suggest Rochdale as the place of origin" (Knox to Doll, 4 January 1954) . The title to the paper, it will be recalled, contains no reference to company or location, nor, indeed, does the text itself. There then followed a period of time in which Knox endeavoured to change the Board's position on the omission of his name as co-author. (Simultaneously, it would seem, the Board tried to use Knox to persuade Doll against publishing at all.'9) Publication The Personal Papers of Sir Richard Doll was delayed as a consequence, until it became apparent that there would be no change of position and Doll and Knox jointly decided that the paper should appear under Doll's name alone.
For my own part, I feel that any positive findings with regard to the cause of cancer must be made available to all research workers in the subject (and not limited to those few with whom we may personally be in contact). There is no knowing, but what may appear at first to have only a limited application in the industrial field may eventually prove to provide an important link in the chain of reasoning by which knowledge of the general causation of the disease may be determined. (Doll to Knox, 8 June 1954) . 2°T here was, however, a little more to the Board's determination than the removal of Knox's name from the paper. To arrive at a more complete picture of the surrounding circumstances, it is necessary to look beyond the Wellcome papers to consider material now in the public domain as a by-product of "discovery" in the Chase Manhattan Bank lawsuit. Some forty years later, Dr Richard Schilling, editor of the British Journal of Industrial Medicine at the time that Doll's paper was submitted, recalled under oath being paid a personal visit by a member of the Turner Brothers Board: "Well, I remember very, very clearly a man with dark hair, who was a Director of Turner & Newall's, coming to me when I was working in the physiology lab, department, of the University of Manchester, asking me to suppress the publication of this article."2' Schilling refused to co-operate with the request and apparently received no further requests of this kind.
The attempt at suppression recounted by Schilling furnishes further context for the period in which the paper approached its delayed publication, a period of time in which Doll re-drafted on more than one occasion the paper's concluding words. Why he did so was the subject of close scrutiny in the cross-examination of Schilling, particular attention being given to a handwritten addition to a letter Doll sent to Schilling (3 December 1954). After noting that he would prefer the paper to be held over until the April issue of 1955, "so as to give the firm an opportunity to show whether they are genuinely anxious to have further research undertaken", Doll added, in ink: "Unless I offer them quid pro quo, we may never find out" (Figure 3 ). Referee comments (also available in the collection) had noted that "data is [sic] 
A -
The Personal Papers of Sir Richard Doll before the development of malignancy (over twenty-six years was the average period for the cases of lung cancer and asbestosis reported in the paper). With the implementation of new regulations in 1931, it was premature to draw, in 1954, firm conclusions about their positive impact on the problem, and an early draft had concluded: "Insufficient data are available to determine whether the risk has yet been eliminated by the improved conditions which now exist." However, this conclusion was to become, in the published text, one that adopted the past tense ("lung cancer was a specific industrial hazard") and a conclusion that suggested that times were beginning to change: "The risk has become progressively less as the duration of employment under the old dusty conditions has decreased" (see Figure 4) . Doll had taken up a suggestion of one of the referees22 and managed to find sufficient comparative data to substantiate a conclusion that offered at the very least the prospect of improvement and, furthermore, served to keep the door open to subsequent studies that might provide conclusions of greater certainty. In fact, it was not long before the world was to change around the Rochdale factory irrevocably as the link between mesothelioma and asbestos began to emerge in incontrovertible data from South Africa, linking forty-five out of forty-seven cases of mesothelioma with exposure to crocidolite (commonly referred to as blue asbestos).23
Doll's quid pro quo can be seen either as the beginning of a working relationship with T&N that would lead to him becoming, in the words of one critic, "a litigation consultant, too, by the early 1980s",24 or it may be viewed, alternatively, as the experienced tactics of a pragmatic epidemiologist. Meanwhile 
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The Spanish Toxic Oil Syndrome26 During the month of May, 1981, clinics in northern Spain were suddenly overrun with people complaining of nausea, rashes, fever, and breathing difficulties. Many would eventually die, and those who survived the epidemic developed wasted muscles, damaged nerves, hair loss and weakened bones. First recognized in May 1981 (some early cases appearing in April), the peak of the epidemic occurred in the following June, and would eventually affect some 30,000 people, including more than 1000 deaths. Geographically, the epidemic was almost confined to fourteen provinces in central and north-west Spain (although Madrid itself was little affected), and spread progressively north-west, from the area around Madrid to Leon.27 The Spanish authorities rapidly determined the cause as adulterated rapeseed oil, sold as inexpensive olive oil. At the time, Spain did not permit rapeseed oil to be imported for human consumption and sought to protect its olive oil industry by ensuring-through the compulsory addition of aniline28 -that any rapeseed oil that was imported was used only industrially. Through numerous street market vendors, however, supplies of the oil were made available for human consumption. It seems that such illegal sales were not a new phenomenon and had previously led to no known ill-health consequences. Had the process of aniline-removal changed in some way, or been imperfectly executed, such that the illicit oil then sold became lethally toxic? Was there a rogue batch, and could it be traced? Not everyone was convinced, however, by the cooking oil theory, and from the very beginning there was a competing theory, that those affected had been poisoned not by adulterated oil but by the over-zealous use by some Spanish farmers of organo-phosphate fertiliser. Tomato crops in particular were suspected. Nevertheless, in 1983, at a specially-convened WHO conference in Madrid, the toxic oil theory was formally accepted by the international health community and the epidemic received the name by which it is now known: Spanish Toxic Oil Syndrome.29 Despite the confidence of the assertion, there remained a number of unresolved epidemiological and toxicological issues, not least that the toxin responsible for causing the outbreak had not been identified (and remains unidentified to It was not long before Doll reported that he was "getting deeper into T.O.S-and into the mire" (Doll to Goulding, 22 May 1985) . In particular, he was concerned to discover that the Spanish government had provided incentives to case-reporting in the form of promised compensation and free medical care, and that the available epidemiological data, much of which seemed to have been gathered in haste, may not have been free from bias. An interim report, presented by Doll at the steering committee meeting of 1 July 1985, outlined the key questions as he saw them. Whilst case-control studies strongly suggested an association of the disease with the adulterated oil, was the association real or an artefact of the method of inquiry? And, if it was a real association, did it reflect cause and effect or was it due to the confounding of the consumption of the oil with something else that was the direct cause? Doll refused to express a conclusive opinion until he had met the Spanish scientists who supported the alternative theory of organo-phosphate poisoning.
Doll met with Dr Clavera Ortiz and Dr Martinez Ruiz in Madrid on 21 September to discuss their views. However, in the absence of hard evidence (Doll to Goulding, 6 December 1985) , he did not find "the alternative suggestion ... at all impressive." He was, however, impressed by their complaint that "the early review committees in Spain consisted almost entirely of people who had been responsible for the positive epidemiological studies", and noted with interest that:
... so-called 'industrial oil' had been more or less routinely imported into Spain for human consumption and that there was likely to have been bias in Spain in the late summer of 1981 in the classification of illnesses which could or could not regularly be associated with the consumption of oil bought in the affected region.
Struck by their sincerity, it was apparent to Doll-and here we glimpse, in his remark, something of his disposition to professional practice-that "they were now emotionally concerned with disproving the oil hypothesis." Following the WHO Madrid conference of 1983, at which the adulterated oil theory did not receive unanimous support, the Spanish authorities had decided to make a renewed enquiry into the evidence so far amassed. Along with a number of other specialists, Clavera Ortiz and Martinez Ruiz formed an official team of investigation which, after reviewing the distribution of the oil and the distribution of the epidemic, quickly came to the inconvenient conclusion, as some have seen it, The Personal Papers of Sir Richard Doll that there was little correlation between the two. Before long, it seems they were dismissed from their investigative roles and the commission was disbanded.30 Doll had delayed in producing his report until he had met them. Although his report of October 1985 did not, unsurprisingly, favour an alternative theory, it did not support the adulterated oil theory with anything like the confidence that its supporters had hoped. "Laboratory studies have ... failed to demonstrate toxicity in any of the samples that were recovered, no specific chemical that might have caused the disease has been identified, and the conclusion that the oil was responsible rests primarily on the epidemiological evidence." As for the epidemiological evidence, there were "too many gaps in [it] to allow the conclusion that oil was definitely the cause." Doll wanted a more exact correlation between the supply of oil and the epidemic's temporal and geographic distribution. Furthermore, there was the issue of linking the numerous sporadic cases to demonstrable exposure to the adulterated oil. Doll's position left the door ajar, however, and pointed ways towards achieving greater certainty. In particular, the problem of sporadic cases turned upon a fundamental principle of epidemiological inquiry, one that calls to mind the widow of Hampstead and her niece who played significant roles in John Snow's investigation of the London cholera outbreak of 1854. It will be recalled that the widow in question was partial to water from a particular pump in Broad Street, Soho, near to where her husband had owned a factory, and therefore insisted upon a daily supply of her favourite water being brought to her. When cholera swept through Soho in the summer of 1854, her taste for water from the Broad Street pump was to cost her dearly, as the only inhabitant of Hampstead to contract cholera and die. She drank the water on Thursday 31 August and died two days later. Her niece, who had chosen an unfortunate time to pay a visit to her aunt, also drank the infected water, then returned to her home in Islington and died the following day.3" Meanwhile, Doll looked forward to obtaining "a list of sporadic cases" of the Spanish toxic syndrome "with a note of the extent to which they were known to be exposed."32
Following the (limited) circulation of Doll's report, concerns were expressed privately between other WHO experts working on the epidemic that its conclusions "might well lead to pressure within Spain to do a great deal of investigation of highly improbable alternative hypotheses" ( Four days later, Kilbourne forwarded a copy of his letter directly to Doll, together with, to add weight, a signed statement from members of the discontinued Spanish clinical investigation commission.33 Doll's response was to send Kilbourne a copy of a letter to Tarkowski (11 December 1985) in which he had reiterated his position, that he did not consider the case for adulterated oil to be proven, and that "it might come to be regarded as proved if it were possible to undertake further research along the lines suggested in the last paragraph of [his] report." Further research continued, such that, by June 1987, Doll had added an Addendum to the report in which he made the unequivocal statement that-notwithstanding an opening caveat that the new evidence was "of variable quality"-many interested parties had been waiting for, and other parties had hoped not to read: "With the addition of this new evidence, I conclude that adulterated oil was the cause of the toxic syndrome."34 It was a shift in position on which Doll was to be closely examined at the trial of the oil suppliers in Milan (Doll testified 6-7 July 1987). Privately, however, Doll wrote to Goulding (1 April 1987) in a manner that suggested some niggling doubts remained about unresolved details and the manner in which much of the epidemiology had been conducted:
The evidence produced is of course strong evidence in support of the association. What is worrying is the omission of any reference to the third convent where the association is far from clear. The selective publication of positive evidence ignoring the little contrary evidence justifies the accusation that only positive evidence is published and makes one wonder whether there may be some justification for the belief that the whole picture has been distorted. I do not believe that this is likely but it strengthens the need for an independent review of the laboratory results in Sevilla, which I recommended, to check that the diagnosis of TOS in the few individuals in the town had not been conditioned by knowledge of their exposure to the oil. I remain most disturbed that Kilbourne should have allowed himself to be used in this way.
Nevertheless, Doll stuck steadfastly to his revised conclusion at the Milan trial, a testimony that was to last for thirteen hours over two days, from which he emerged The Personal Papers of Sir Richard Doll into the light of day-gentleman guarantor of justice and compensation35-to the cheers of victims of the epidemic and their families.
It is striking how significant a role is played by the choice of words in the presentation of epidemiological findings over and above non-verbal data more readily associated with scientific communication. The 1955 paper on lung cancer and asbestos exposure received, as we have seen, considerable re-drafting to strike an appropriate note. Whilst we can safely assume that an appropriate note is one that presents to its readership research findings with both fidelity and clarity, the additional shaping pressure of audience is another influential factor, particularly when the interested readership comprises more than the professional attention of peers. In the case of the Spanish "arbitration" exercise that Doll undertook, there were also language and cultural barriers to surmount. When Kilbourne expressed doubts about the wording of Doll's conclusion to his report, fearing "misinterpretation", he was noting the likely influence of culturally-determined differences in reception between an English and a Spanish audience. "I fear this based on the way I have seen criticism given and taken here" (Kilbourne to Doll, 29 November 1985) . Kilbourne wanted a more explicit statement, that further research in support of the adulterated oil theory was the likeliest avenue of pursuit to provide the conclusive evidence desired by all. Even the vagaries of (a WHO) translation played a not insignificant role in the presentation of Doll's argument, when Kilbourne advised Doll that decena can be translated as either ten precisely or, less precisely, ten or so or about ten (Kilbourne to Doll, 9 September 1985). Here, the difference in translation was not a point of style but was material to the epidemiological evidence, in so far as it determined whether or not the nuns of the convent at Casarrubios del Monte had purchased supplies of adulterated oil (it having been firmly established that adulterated oil was not available for sale before 11 February 1981).36
Concluding Remarks
As we have seen from the two examples discussed above, many sections of society are likely to have a stake in the outcome of any given exercise of epidemiological research. Its public health orientation, encompassing occupational health, guarantees that many voices will conspire to ensure that the wise epidemiologist is one who chooses his or her words with care, fully cognizant of the scrutiny they will receive from many pairs of eyes. Misrepresentation by the press, however, is one prospect that cannot be easily guarded against, and, within the mass of material in the Doll papers, there is a remarkable file of letters to Doll from a section of the general public perhaps least expected to give vent to invective. I shall conclude with some brief comments on these letters.
In 
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The Personal Papers of Sir Richard Doll and a survival-determination that instinctively springs from fear and threat. Doll took the trouble to reply to each correspondent (in the file, there is a clutch of letters marked No address, reminiscent of material from a Central Middlesex Hospital trial) outlining his misrepresentation, and some wrote back to retract hasty words, some astonished that a Knight of the Realm should contact them directly.
Doll's strong sense of historical tradition would have alerted him to a certain irony in his position. Indeed, there are several ironies that can be teased out. For Doll was not the only knighted Regius Professor of Medicine to be associated in newspaper headlines with the suggestion of natural limitations to the human span, and to human abilities as the years advance. In 1905, on retiring from John Hopkins University as Professor of Medicine, shortly to take up his appointment as Regius Professor of Medicine in Oxford, William Osler's valedictory address to his American colleagues asserted "the comparative uselessness of men above forty years of age" and, losing the "comparative" qualification, "the uselessness of men above sixty years of age."' The title of Osler's address, 'The fixed period', was taken from a novel by Anthony Trollope by the same name.4' Set in the late twentieth century-approximately, that is, co-terminous with Doll's briefing to the Medical Journalists' Association, to cite another irony-on a fictitious island off New Zealand in which "men retired for a year of contemplation before a peaceful departure by chloroform",42 Trollope's dystopia unfolds the social dynamic of ageism. On the imaginary island of Britannula, the young inhabitants, in the guise of relieving suffering and benefiting society, devise a system that discriminates against the elderly. However, as they grow old themselves, we are not surprised to read that they begin to see things differently and rebel against the system they had devised.
Osler claimed that his valedictory words were intended "to relieve a situation of singular sadness", although he did not change his view that "after the sixtieth year it would be best for the world and best for themselves if men rested from their labours."43 Notwithstanding, Osler was to continue working at Oxford for another ten productive years, and Sir Richard Doll, born in 1912, who will be enjoying his ninetieth birthday this year, did not publish his earliest work of note before vigorously peering across Osler's first threshold of uselessness. 
